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I. INTRODUCTION

While the requirement of originality is characterized as both the
"sine qua non"' and the "touchstone of copyright protection," 2 the
originality required to vest protection in the commercially significant
area of fact collection, such as the database industry, was decided by
the United States Supreme Court only recently in Feist Publicationsv.
Rural Telephone Service Co.3 The decision of the Supreme Court both
to reject the test which permitted copyright protection for works which
were the result of industrious effort and to require some modicum of
creative effort places in doubt the availability of copyright protection
for not only traditional compilations, such as the white pages directory

* Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law; B.A., 1969, J.D.,
1972, University of Minnesota; LL.M., 1976, Yale University.
1. Kamar Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 E2d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 1981).
2. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 E2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. July 1981).
3. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
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involved in Feist, but also for more complex databases.4 Thus, the
Court's ruling in Feist may result in the evolution of a "thin" copyright which affords only minimal protection.
II.

A.

THE REQUIREMENT OF ORIGINALITY

Introduction

Before copyright protection is granted, a work must contain sufficient originality to comply with the constitutional requirements for
such protection: "[The Congress shall have Power] To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries. 5 Because this provision was deliberated in secret
and adopted without debate, the comment of James Madison in THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS is the best statement of the public policy interest
which motivated giving Congress the power to grant patents and copyrights:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of
authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right at common law. The right to useful inventions, seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases, with
the claims of individuals.6

A century and a half later, the Supreme Court stated the economic
philosophy behind the empowerment of protection for copyrights and
patents:

4. From a copyright perspective, databases are treated as compilations and receive
copyright protection to the extent that the originality requirements for compilations are met.
See COPYRIGHT OFFICE CIRCULAR 65, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR AUTOMATED DATABASES, reprinted in 1 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 1 15,054 (1992).

5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
6. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 288 (James Madison) (Modem Library College ed.
1937). The text of the constitutional provision evolved through several versions which are
reprinted in PHILIP B. KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, 3 THE FOUNDERS'

(1987).

CONSTITUTION 40
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The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through
the talents of authors and inventors in "Science and useful Arts." Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate
with the services rendered.'

The standard of originality evolved through an extended series of
cases, beginning with Justice Story's articulation of the originality
requirement in Gray v. Russell.8 This doctrine was more fully developed by the Supreme Court in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony,9 dealing with copyright in a photograph, and in Bleinstein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., dealing with copyright in a circus
poster. These two decisions dramatically broadened the availability of
copyright protection and provided a framework by which the constitutional dimensions of the originality requirement continued to develop
in works exhibiting an individual mark of authorship in their creation."
Finally, the constitutional provision authorizing patent and copyright protection has compelled a federally granted protection for both
patents and copyrights which is necessarily national in scope. 2 Thus,

7. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1953). Similar statements appear in many
other cases. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546

(1985); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1974) (ultimate public
benefit is the preeminent purpose underlying copyright law); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v.
Reynolds, 911 .2d 970, 975 (4th Cir. 1990); In re Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380

(C.C.P.A.
8.
9.
10.

1951).
10 F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5728).
111 U.S. 53 (1884).
188 U.S. 239 (1903).

11. For a historical review of the development the requirement of originality, see Dale
P. Olson, Copyright Originality, 48 Mo. L. REV. 29 (1983).
12. See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) ("The objective of the
Copyright Clause was clearly to facilitate the granting of rights national in scope."); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964) (goal of federal scheme of protection is "to have national uniformity in patent and copyright laws"); see also Mitchell Bros.
Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 858 (5th Cir. 1979) (national scope of
copyright protection used as a ground to reject a morality (or obscenity) standard being imposed as a condition of copyright protection).
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the Constitution restricts the states' right to limit access to materials
which the federal scheme has left unprotected.13
B. The Extent of Copyright Protection Under the
Copyright Act of 1976
Copyright protection, under the Copyright Act of 1976,14 extends
from the time of a work's creation. 15 Copyright grants a series of
exclusive rights 6 which are delineated in section 106 of the Act.' 7
An infringement action, to enforce rights granted under the statute and
to recover damages, requires that a work be original and that the action be brought by the owner of the particular right being enforced. 8
In turn, infringement occurs when a copyrighted work is used in
one of the five ways prohibited by the statute.' 9 The exclusive rights
granted to the copyright owner which may not be infringed upon by
another are the rights: (1) to reproduce the work, (2) to prepare derivative works from the copyrighted work, (3) to distribute the copyrighted
work, (4) to perform the work, and (5) to display the work publicly.
The subject matter of copyright is expansive2° and covers all
original works fixed in a tangible medium of expression.2 ' Protection,
13. Federal preemption forecloses state protection, under a theory of unfair competition, under § 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C § 301 (1988). See Financial
Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investor's Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 204, 208-09 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987).
14. 17 U.S.C §§ 101-801 (1976).
15. Harper & Row, Publishers, v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985).
16. These exclusive rights are subject to a series of exceptions and compulsory licenses. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-119 (1988).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988). Section 106 contains the "'bundle of rights' that is a
copyright, are cumulative and may overlap in some cases." H.R. REP. No. 147, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 61 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674.
18. See, e.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971, 980 (2d
Cir. 1991).
19. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984).
20. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1233-34, 1239 (3d Cir.
1986) (computer program copyright includes structure of program as well as underlying code
generating program); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) (computer operating system within subject
matter of copyright).
21. See Building Officials & Code Adm. v. Code Technology, Inc., 628 F.2d 730,
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however, is accorded to the original work of authorship, not to the
material object in which it is contained.22
C. TraditionalOriginality Standardsfor Copyright Protection
I Historically, the standard for originality has been modest. 23
This
lenient requirement for copyright protection was based on a historically
developed standard which was codified24 into the Copyright Act of
1976. This statutory statement of the historically developed tests requires a work to be "an original work' 25of authorship" which is "fixed
in any tangible medium of expression.
The standard for originality required under section 102(a) of the
Act has been addressed in a number of cases and has been reasonably
settled for works other than compilations.26 But, until the Supreme

734 (1st Cir. 1980) (rule of "free access" forecloses copyright in legal authorities).
22. See, e.g., Andrien v. Southern Ocean County Chamber of Commerce, 927 F.2d
132, 135 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666):
Thus, in the sense of the bill, a "book" is not a work of authorship, but is a
particular kind of "copy." Instead, the author may write a "literary work," which
in turn can be embodied in a wide range of "copies" and "phonorecords," including books, periodicals, computer punch cards, microfilm, tape recordings, and so
forth.
23. If the originality requirement is met, a work is entitled to copyright protection
even if an identical work is in the public domain. See United States v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d
448, 451 n.4 (9th Cir. 1978). For a review of the historical development of the originality
standard, see Olson, supra note 11.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). The legislative history accompanying § 102(a) states:
The phrase "original works of authorship" which is purposely left undefined,
is intended to incorporate without change the standard of originality established by
the courts under the present copyright statute. This standard does not include requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or aesthetic merit, and there is not intention to
enlarge the standard of copyright protection to require them.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5664.
25. 17. U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
26. A notable exception was in the Seventh Circuit's opinion establishing the standard
for derivative works. See Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983) (emphasizing the need for a significant variation between the underlying and derivative works). In
other circuits, the standard for derivative works, while sometimes problematic to ideniify, is
consistently applied. Compare Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99
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Court's decision in Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service
Co.,27 there was no definitive answer as to the copyrightability of
compilations 8 of facts,29 such as directories. The resulting ambiguity
had presented particular problems in applying an originality test. Thus,
different tests were developed and applied in different circuits.
The traditional "sweat of the brow" test, permitting copyright
protection merely for "industrious collection," was followed by the
Seventh, 0 Eighth, 31 and Tenth Circuits.32 These circuit decisions
followed from 'an early statement of Justice Clifford in Lawrence v.

(2d Cir. 1951) with L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976) which emphasize the originality of the derivative work in assessing copyrightability.
27. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
28. The Copyright Act of 1976 defines a compilation as "a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or
arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of
authorship." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). However, the statute further provides that a compilation is subject to a restricted scope of protection since
copyright in a compilation . . . extends only to the material contributed by the
author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in
the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material. The
copyright in such a work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the
scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting material.
17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988). Original creation of a work is always a defense to copyright infringement, since "a copyrighted directory is not infringed by a similar directory which is
the product of independent work." Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954). See generally
Note, Copyrighted Compilations of Facts in a Public Domain Directory: The Criteria of
Infringement, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 833, 841 (1977).
29. A compilation may also exist in the assembly of text and visual elements, such as
in a label. See, e.g., Drop Dead Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 326 F.2d 87, 93 (2d Cir.
1963).
30. See Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Ser. Co. of Colo., 768 F.2d 145,
149 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The collector may change the form of the information and so make it
more accessible, or he may change the organization and so make it more understandable.");
Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1977); G.R. Leonard & Co. v.
Stack, 386 F.2d 38, 39 (7th Cir. 1967); Edwards & Deutsch Lithographing Co. v. Boorman,
15 F.2d 35 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 738 (1926).
31. See Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Frontier Directory Co. of Minn., 770 F.2d 128 (8th
Cir. 1985); see also West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987) (holding that the pagination and arrangement of
cases within the National Reporter System were subject to copyright protection).
32. See Ehat v. Tanner, 780 F.2d 876 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 820
(1986).
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Dana33 and in the directory context from Leon v. Pacific Telephone
& Telegraph Co.3 which held that "labor is protectible":
Copyright may justly be claimed by an author of a book who has taken
existing materials from sources common to all writers, and arranged and
combined them in a new form, and given them an application unknown
before, for the reason that, in so doing, he has exercised skill and discretion in making these selection, arrangements, and combinations, and, having presented something that is new and useful, he is entitled to the exclusive enjoyment of his improvement, as provided in the copyright act.35

Although it was clearly recognized that facts alone were not subject to copyright protection, 36 a collection of facts based on industrious effort was deemed to be subject to copyright protection.37 As the
court stated in National Business Lists v. Dun & Bradstreet,Inc.:
This court respectfully suggests that the directory cases, rather than being a
breed apart, are the most striking illustrations in copyright law that the
misappropriation doctrine most commonly associated with International
News Serv. v. Associated Press, has there long found a house, if not a
home. Compilations, being more the product of diligent application and
less the result of intellectual creativity than possibly any other form of
protectable work, are at one end of a spectrum extending to art, poetry
and music. Diligent application has, through copyright, been accorded a
measure8 of protection because that is the only protection which is mean3
ingful.

33. 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136).
34. 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937). Leon was later overruled by the Ninth Circuit in
Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 E2d 569, 572-74 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 977 (1988).
35. Lawrence, 15 F. Cas. at 57-58.
36.

17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988); see, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters.,

471 U.S. 539, 548, 556 (1985).
37. West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987) (pagination of reporter system copyrightable); Toro Co.
v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1986) (use of randomly assigned serial numbers not copyright infringement); Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Frontier Directory Co., 770 F.2d
128 (8th Cir. 1985) (white pages protectible as compilation); Rockford Map Publishers, Inc.
v. Directory Ser. Co. of Colo., 768 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061
(1986) (map based upon public records subject to copyright protection); Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F2d 859, 862 (2d Cir. 1984) (arrangement and selection of 18,000 baseball
cards into categories protectible). See generally Robert C. DeNicola, Copyright in Collections
Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 516 (1981).
38. 552 E Supp. 89, 95 (N.D. 111. 1982) (citation omitted); see also Schroeder v.
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Even under the "sweat of the brow" test, a significant exception to
the subject matter of copyright excludes protection for blank forms.39
Although a form in which an explanation accompanies the form may
qualify for protection,' a form used only for recording information is
precluded from receiving copyright protection.4"
However, the "sweat of the brow" test was far from uniformly
accepted, and the Second, 42 Fourth, 43 Fifth,44 Ninth,45 and Eleventh" Circuits developed originality tests requiring an element which
represents a "modicum of selection, coordination or arrangement 47 on
the compiler's part which may be represented by the exclusion of
certain facts; however, these tests did not permit copyright merely for
industrious collection. The Second Circuit summarized the objection to
allowing copyright protection for merely collecting facts in its leading
case of Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Service,

William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir. 1977) ("An original compilation of names
and addresses is copyrightable even though the individual names and addresses are in the
public domain and not copyrightable.").
39. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), which is codified in Copyright Office
regulations: "The following are examples of works not subject to copyright . . . . (c) Blank
forms, such as time cards, graph paper, account books, diaries, bank checks, scorecards,
address books, report forms, order forms and the like, which are designed for recording
information and do not in themselves convey information." 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(c) (1991).
40. See Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.-East, 542 F.2d 1053,
1061 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977). See generally Dale P. Olson, The
Legal Protection of Printed Systems, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 45 (1978).
41. See, e.g., Bibbero Sys., Inc. v. Colwell Sys., Inc., 893 F.2d 1104, 1107-08 (9th
Cir. 1990) ("Superbill" used by physicians to record charges and containing significant text
still a blank, and unopyrightable, form); John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711
F.2d 966, 971 (11th Cir. 1983).
42. See Financial Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Ser., Inc., 751 F.2d 501, 506 (2d
Cir. 1984); Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862-63 (2d Cir. 1984).
43. See Konor Enters. v. Eagle Publications, 878 F.2d 138, 140 (4th Cir. 1989).
44. See Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369-70 (5th Cir. July
1981).
45. See Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569, 572-74 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 977 (1988); Cooling Sys. & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777
F.2d 485, 491 (9th Cir. 1985).
46. See Southwestern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory Publishing
Co., 756 F.2d 801, 809-10 (11th Cir. 1985).
47. Financial Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Ser., Inc., 751 F.2d 507 (2d Cir.
1984).
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which found such an approach inconsistent with the essential
requirements of copyright law that protection
Ic.,48

not be determined by the amount of effort the author expends, but rather
by the nature of the final result. To grant copyright protection based merely on the "sweat of the author's brow" would risk putting large areas of
factual research material off limits and threaten the public's unrestrained
access to information."

D. Traditional Test for Copyright Infringement
American copyright law has long protected directories as a type of
compilation." Even white pages, which are merely alphabetical arrangements, were protectible before Feist in those circuits which applied the "industrious collection" test which rewarded labor or investment and did not impose a creativity test.51 Indeed, the Eighth Circuit
held page arrangements of a law reporter likewise subject to copyright
protection.52 Protection for these works was accorded under the rubric
of protecting compilations. Further, copyright protection is available for
any component of a work that, standing alone, embodies sufficient
3
5

originality.

The corollary of the originality standard is the test for determining
whether a copyright on a compilation has been infringed. An infringement action ordinarily requires the plaintiff to own a valid copyright

48. 808 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987).
49. lt at 207.
50. In Jeweler's Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922),
the court emphasized the labor-intensive nature of creating a directory by stating: "The man
who goes through the streets of a town and puts down the names of each of the inhabitants, with their occupations and their street number, acquires material of which he is the
author. He produces by his labor a meritorious composition, in which he may obtain a
copyright .

. . ."

Id

at 88.

51. See Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Frontier Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1985).
52. See West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent. Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987).
53. See generally Christian H. Nadan, Note, A Proposal to Recognize Component
Works: How a Teddy Bears on the Competing Ends of Copyright Law, 78 CAL. L. REv.
1633 (1990).
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and to show that the work has been copied54 in a manner which intrudes upon the exclusive rights granted in the Copyright Act of 1976.
An expansive view of this doctrine was applied in Schroeder v.
William Morrow & Co.55 where infringement was found even though
the court acknowledged that the individual facts copied were in the
public domain and not copyrightable: "Another is entitled to make his
own compilation of the same names and addresses using information
in the public domain, but he is not entitled merely to copy the copyright list."5
The Seventh Circuit later affirmed its holding in Schroeder in a
case where'the defendant's map had been researched from the
plaintiff's copyrighted map rather than by reviewing original property
deeds in the recorder's office. Failure to perform that step of developing the underlying facts independently 0onstituted infringement, 57 even
when the copied facts were used to create a different map."
III.

A.

THIN COPYRIGHTS

Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co.

Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court's review of the law
involving simple alphabetical compilations arose in Feist Publications
54. See New York Chinese TV Programs v. U.E. Enters., 954 F.2d 847, 849 (2d Cir.
1992); Eckes v Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d '859, 861 (2d Cir. 1984).
55. 566 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1977).
56. Id.at 5-6.
57. See, e.g., Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Ser. Co. of Colo., 768 F.2d
145, 149-50 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986).
58.

THE REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNO-

LOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS [hereinafter CONTU] which was established by
Congress during the copyright revision process which resulted in the Copyright Act of 1976,
stated:
The use of one item retrieved from such a work-be it an address, a chemical
formula or a citation to an article-would not under reasonable circumstances merit
the attention of the copyright proprietor. Nor would it conceivably constitute infringement of copyright. The retrieval and reduplication of any substantial portion
of a database, whether or not the individual data are in the public domain, would
likely constitute a duplication of the copyrighted element of the database and
would be infringement.
CONTU Final Report 103 (1978).
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v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 9 In this case the district court held
that a publisher who created an area directory from the telephone
company's alphabetical white pages containing names, towns, and
telephone numbers infringed on the telephone company's copyright.:
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished opinion.6' The United
States Supreme Court reversed the holding below that simple, alphabetical white pages were copyrightable; accordingly, the second
publisher's use of the directory could not constitute copyright infringement.
The Court's decision in Feist includes not only a specific holding
which disqualifies the most mechanically organized works from copyright protection, but also the unequivocal rejection of the so-called
"sweat of the brow" or "industrious collection" doctrine. This doctrine
had allowed copyright protection for works based merely upon investment of labor or money in compiling a work without requiring the
originality inherent in creative labor. Under Fiest, however, originality,
albeit of a minimal kind, is now required before a work may become
subject to copyright protection.
An undeniable tension exists between the propositions that facts
are not copyrightable and that compilations of facts generally are copyrightable. Many compilations consist of nothing but raw data-i.e.,
wholly factual information not accompanied by any original written
expression. On what basis may one claim copyright in such a work?
Common sense tells us that the status of 100 uncopyrightable facts
does not magically change when gathered together in one place. Yet
copyright law seems to contemplate that compilations that consist
exclusively of facts are potentially within its scope:
The key to resolving the tension lies in understanding why facts are not
copyrightable. The sine qua non of copyright is originality. To qualify for
copyright protection, a work must be original to the author. Original, as
the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently

59. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
60. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, 663 F. Supp. 214 (D. Kan. 1987),

aff'd, 916 F.2d 718 (loth Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S.Ct. 1282 (1991).
61. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990), rev'd,
I11 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
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created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it
possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they
possess some creative spark, "no matter how crude, humble or obvious" it
might be.62

From this analysis, the Court emphasizes the long established
premise that originality is a constitutional requirement that dictates
different results in terms of copyright protection between facts and factual compilations. Facts are unprotectible because facts do not owe
their origin to an act of authorship. The distinction is one between
creation and discovery: the first person to find and report a particular
fact has not created the fact: he or she has merely discovered its existence. 3
Accordingly, facts of every variety-"scientific, historical, biographical, and news of the day"'-are unprotectible and in the public.
domain. Thus, as the Court recognizes in Feist:
This inevitably means that the copyright in a factual compilation is
thin. Notwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler remains free
to use the facts contained in another's publication to aid in preparing a
competing work, so long as the competing work does not feature the same
selection and arrangement ....
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler's labor
may be used by others without compensation .... [However,] [t]he primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors but "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts." . . . To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages
others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.
This principle, known as the idea/expression or fact/expression dichotomy,
applies to all works of authorship. As applied to a factual compilation,
assuming the absence of original written expression, only the compiler's
selection and arrangement may be protected; the raw facts may be copied
at will. This result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means by
which copyright advances the progress of science and art.

62. Fiest, 111 S.Ct. at 1287 (citations omitted).
63. Id.at 1288.
64. I& at 1289; see also Miller v. Universal Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1372 (5th
Cir. July 1981) (emphasizing that the distinction between protectible expression and
unprotectible facts "cannot be maintained if research is held copyrightable.").
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This, then, resolves the doctrinal tension: Copyright treats facts and
factual compilations in a wholly consistent manner. Facts, whether alone or
as part of a compilation, are not original and therefore may not be copyrighted. A factual compilation is eligible for copyright if it features an
original selection or arrangement of facts, but the copyright is limited to
the particular selection or arrangement. In no event may copyright extend
to the facts themselves.'

Thus, the Court in Feist rejects the Supreme Court rejected the
"sweat of the brow" doctrine on the premise that courts accepting the
doctrine "eschewed the most fundamental axiom of copyright law-that
no one may copyright facts or ideas."6 However, a genuine question
remains: What is protectible under Feist?
The Court notes that the originality requirement is not very strict,
"A compiler may settle upon a selection or arrangement that others
have used; novelty is not required. Originality requires only that the
author make the selection or arrangement independently (i.e., without
copying that selection or arrangement from another work), and that it
display some minimal level of creativity."67 Most compilations will
68
pass this test.
It appears that even if a work qualifies as a copyrightable compilation, it receives only limited protection. 69 Thus, after Feist, how
extensive is copyright protection for those compilations which meet the
originality requirement?
B.

The Status of Compilations After Fiest

Because the rule in Feist is straightforward for simple, mechanical
compilations and requires the identification of an organizing principle
as a basis for copyright protection, many of the cases following the

65. Fiest, 111 S. Ct. at 1288-90 (citations omitted).
66. 111 S. Ct. at 1291.
67. ld at 1294.
68. IX
69. This is the point of section 103 of the Copyright Act. Accordingly, the selection
and coordination of the facts reported by prospective subscribers to the telephone company
did not qualify for copyright protection.
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Supreme Court's decision have been predictable in their results. Several cases illustrate the application of Feist in determining the
copyrightability of compilations.
In Key Publications v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enterprises,°
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held, applying Feist and
its own case law, that the use of factual information, taken from a
yellow-page phone directory, in compiling a business directory did not
constitute copyright infringement so long as the information in the
second directory was arranged differently from the source directory.
Accordingly, when the second publisher in assembling a compilation
different from the first compilation is guided by a different selection
principle, he is only appropriating factual information which is not
protectible. This result is consistent not only with Feist but also with
the earlier case law in the Second Circuit."1 However, the Second
Circuit emphasized that while a copyright in a factual compilation is
"thin . . . we do not believe that it is anorexic. ' ,72 Further,
[a]lIthough the test for infringement of original works and compilations is
one of "substantial similarity," the appropriate inquiry is narrowed in the
case of a compilation. As noted, the components of a compilation are
generally in the public domain and a finding of substantial similarity or
even absolute identity as to matters in the public domain will not suffice
to prove copyright infringement. What must be shown is substantial simi70. 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991).
71. The court cited its decision in Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d
303, 309-10 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967) as the starting point for its
rejection of the "sweat of the brow" doctrine. Infringement may still occur when the selection of facts is appropriated by a subsequent publisher if the arrangement of the facts, in
addition to the uncopyrightable facts themselves, is copied, as in Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984), where a listing of 18,000 baseball cards contained a
subset of 5,000 cards identified as "premium" cards, and the second directory consisted
solely of these same "premium" cards.
In contrast, in the post-Feist case of Victor Lalli Enters. v. Big Red Apple, Inc.,
936 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1991), infringement was alleged in compilations of numbers used in
illegal gambling in New York City;-the numbers, however, were ascertained based on results at area race tracks. Consistent with a rejection of the "sweat of the brow" theory, a
compilation consisting entirely of public domain information was unprotectible, and since the
format of the chart was a "convention" and itself unprotectible, there was no copyrightable

material. Accordingly, even a mechanical reproduction of the charts did not constitute copyright infringement.
72. 945 F.2d at 514.
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larity between those elements, and only those elements that provide
copyrightability in the allegedly infringed compilation.
Broader protection would necessarily preclude competitors from using
elements in the public domain and would impede rather than encourage
originality and creativity in future compilations. Broader protection would
thus thwart the underlying goals of copyright protection. This limitation is
codified in section 103 of the Copyright Act, which provides that "[t]he
copyright in a compilation... extends only to the material contributed by
the author of such work, as distinguished from preexisting material."73

Consistent with that construction of Feist, the court found that
there was no infringement since the only duplication of material was
not in the subjective categories but rather in listings within a category.
Since "[p]lacing listings within categories is the sort of mechanical
task that does not merit copyright protection," 4 no infringement occurred. A similar result was reached by the Seventh Circuit in reviewing a telephone white pages directory case on remand from the Supreme Court to reevaluate on the basis of Feist.7'
But not all compilations are foreclosed from protection under the
Feist standard, nor is that the Supreme Court's result in developing a
consistent standard for evaluating the copyrightability of compilations.
In an unpublished decision, U.S. Payphone, Inc. v. Executives Unlimited of Durham, Inc.,7 6 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
found the requisite degree of subjective judgment necessary for converting public domain material-state tariffs governing payphones-into
a copyright. That requirement was met by the demonstration contained
in the record that the single page per state format used by the plaintiff
was only one of many alternative formats and that hundreds of hours
had been expended in synthesizing the material into a useable format."

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

itLat 515.
Il
See Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines & Co., 932 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1991).
931 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1991) (table).
IL See also, Budish v. Gordon, 781 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Ohio 1992) where the

omission of information from a "cluttered" source resulted in a simplified presentation of
material which was accorded copyright protection.
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Similarly, in Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Donnelley Information Publishing78 the composition of a telephone yellow
pages directory was deemed distinguishable from the alphabetically
arranged white pages in Feist. The directory was found to demonstrate
sufficient creativity in its format, although not the information presented, to qualify the format for copyright protection.79
These cases demonstrate both the nature of the factual evaluation
of originality in compilations and the modest degree of originality required to vest copyright in a compilation. With the abandonment of
the "industrious collection" doctrine, which rewarded labor rather than
authorship, the Supreme Court in Feist has imposed requirements on
compilations which emphasize the constitutionally mandated requirement of authorship. Still, the originality requirement for all works
remains modest. Feist simply requires compilations to meet this requirement in the same manner as other works.
IV. CONCLUSION
Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co.8" is a major
authority that did not so much abruptly depart from existing authority
as refine the existing case law into a consistent approach which rejected the "sweat of the brow" test. In its holding, the Supreme Court also
brought a significant element of certainty to the question of compilations of factual works while also bringing about a consistent national
standard by which to measure the requirement of originality in compilations which places the emphasis, appropriately, on authorship rather
than effort. The undefined dimensions in the originality doctrine are
now more adequately defined in a manner that recognizes the constitutional boundaries foreclosing copyright in works which are not genuinely original, in however modest a sense.

78. 933 R2d 952 (11th Cir. 1991).
79. Id at 957.
80. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).

